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ABSTRACT 
In 1964, the United States Agency for International Development created the Partners of the 
Alliance for Progress to match state-level civilian volunteer organizations in the United States and Latin 
America. Local Partners of the Alliance chapters coordinated cultural, technical, and material exchanges 
between civilians in two sub-national regions to increase the visibility and perceived efficacy of the 
Alliance for Progress within Latin American communities. Previous works on Cold War diplomacy in 
Latin America have focused on the Alliance for Progress as a largely-ineffective federal program. These 
studies have neglected the role of the civilian Partners volunteers in supporting Alliance activity.  This 
thesis examines the United States’ Partners of the Alliance for Progress program, specifically the 
formation and activities of the Iowa-Yucatán Partners of the Alliance from establishment in 1965 to 
privatization in the early 1970s.  
The Iowa-Yucatán Partners largely focused on the technical and economic development of 
Yucatán, which required the transportation of American civilian experts and their supplies across the 
United States-Mexico border. The Iowa-Yucatán Partners relied on their civilian status to avoid political 
obstruction, scrutiny, and costs that might be incurred by moving development supplies across the border 
in an official diplomatic capacity. Tourism became a useful tool for the Iowa-Yucatán Partners’ activities 
to lure technical experts and American consumers to Yucatán and to transport supplies as personal 
luggage, which subverted Mexico’s control over imported materials. Blending tourist, technician, and 
diplomat identities, the Iowa-Yucatán Partners reinforced American perceptions of Latin America as a 
space for Americans to consume “exotic” cultures and transform “deficient” environments. This research 
invites further historical study of the political and cultural implications of civilian diplomacy and 
“voluntourism,” which have perpetuated the United States’ informal empire in Latin America. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
On February 2, 1969, a quiet conspiracy was carried out in the border town of Laredo, 
Texas. More than three hundred gleaming Air Stream trailers flocked around Laredo’s Civic 
Center. The trailers’ occupants, mostly retired American couples, filed inside for a final 
“Rendezvous Program” before commencing their journey across the United States-Mexico 
border. The group was bound for the distant Mexican state of Yucatán, on the sixty-third caravan 
trip of the Wally Byam Caravan Club. These Rendezvous Programs allowed the caravan 
members to prepare for their two-month excursion through 12 states, 21 cities, and over 4000 
miles on a “Caravan to Antiquity.”1 Among the crowd of retirees and trailer enthusiasts in 
Laredo were Jeanette Westfall and Kay Schlacks. The two women shared a great deal in 
common: both lived in small-town Iowa, both were retired but highly-active travelers, and both 
were members of a private philanthropic society, the PEO Sisterhood.2 They also shared a secret 
plan.  
Jeanette Westfall took the lead on the clandestine recruitment plan. Westfall was not a 
member of the Caravan Club, but she was invited by her PEO “Sister” Kay Schlacks to give a 
presentation at the Rendezvous on their destination, the Yucatán Peninsula. She brought along 
hundreds of vibrant photographic slides to display the “ancient” beauty of Chichen Itza and Isla 
Mujeres, and the region’s more modern attractions. Westfall’s slides depicted project sites where 
missionaries were working to introduce American-style medicine, education, infrastructure, and 
                                                 
1 Flyer for “Airstream Wally Byam Caravan to Antiquity – Yucatán #63 – Rendezvous Laredo, Texas, February 2, 
1969,” Iowa-Yucatán Partners of the Americas Papers, Box 18 Folder 1, Iowa State University Special Collections, 
Ames, IA (hereafter cited as ISU MS 034). The flyer is hand-labeled “Caravan #1”  like other documents in this file 
related to this trip, suggesting that the Iowa-Yucatán Partners association with the caravan group continued in later 
trips. 
2 Kay Schlacks to Jeanette Westfall, November 21, 1968 - ISU MS 034 Box 18 Folder 1. 
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agriculture to Yucatán. For years, Westfall had been promoting development projects in Yucatán 
and her slides were always accompanied by a well-rehearsed script on the various problems and 
advancements of the region. After the Rendezvous concluded, Westfall and Schlacks quietly 
approached members of the Caravan Club to ask if they had a little room in their cramped Air 
Streams for a few extra pieces of cargo.3 The women packed up six boxes of medicine, two 
boxes of hearing aids, powdered milk, over a dozen electric sewing machines, and heaping bags 
of donated clothes to distribute among the Air Streams.4  Just a few weeks later, after crossing 
the border with “no trouble at all” and reaching the distant capital city of Mérida, Yucatán, the 
caravanners delivered their goods to the U.S. Consulate and visited a number of the local 
missionary clinics.5 Unbeknownst to the caravan club’s leaders, these two Iowa women had 
turned their “caravanners” into smugglers. 
Given the financial and practical barriers to transporting donated goods from the United 
States to Mexico, Schlacks and her fellow caravanners were “like an answer to a prayer” for 
Jeanette Westfall. Westfall was an active member in the Iowa-Yucatán Partners of the Alliance 
for Progress, a transnational diplomatic and development program. The Partners were constantly 
searching for faster and cheaper ways to move donated goods to distant Yucatán.6 The Iowa-
Yucatán Partners were part of the United States’ nation-wide Partners of the Alliance for 
Progress program, which existed as a federally-administered program between 1964 and 1970 
and continues to this day as an entirely private organization. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the 
Partners program was intended to create “people-to-people diplomacy” between Latin America 
and the United States. The Partners’ efforts to carry out development projects in Mexico were 
                                                 
3 Jeanette Westfall to Kay Schlacks, December 3, 1968 - ISU MS 034 Box 18 Folder 1.  
4 “Notes from Dr. and Mrs. Westfall” to William Harben, February 2, 1969 - ISU MS 034 Box 18 Folder 6. 
5 Kay Schlacks to Jeanette Westfall, March 5, 1969 - ISU MS 034 Box 18 Folder 1. 
6 Jeanette Westfall to Kay Schlacks, December 3, 1968 - ISU MS 034 Box 18 Folder 1. 
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constantly stymied by the politics and logistics of getting necessary materials across the border, 
as shipment and posting were “prohibitive in cost, and customs officials are not so generous 
about shipments of items.”7 By getting these goods across the border in their personal luggage, 
the caravanners were allowing small-scale development projects to continue in the Yucatán 
Peninsula, while also subverting the authority of the Mexican government. This caravanning trip, 
and the repeat trips that followed, was just one of the many ways the Iowa-Yucatan Partners took 
advantage of civilian and tourist identities to expand the technological, economic, and political 
influence of the United States. These types of activities created a “tourist-technician” model of 
development, in which civilian diplomats simultaneously carried out the transformation and 
consumption of a foreign space. They did so by attracting experts and donors to support 
development through rhetoric which cast Yucatán as an exotic and backward place. Through a 
wide array of projects intended to exert a cultural and technological dominance on Yucatecan 
civilians, the Partners’ civilian diplomats and experts perpetuated the United States’ “informal 
empire” in Latin America.8 
The Iowa-Yucatán Partners wished to carry out multiple simultaneous modernization and 
development projects to improve the faltering economy in the Yucatán Peninsula of Mexico, 
which they perceived as geopolitically vulnerable to communist threats. Transportation costs, the 
inaccessibility of remote rural villages, and the significant resistance by the Mexican government 
of “hand-me-down” American supplies were major challenges to the Partners. The group 
therefore used their public-private structure to channel resources of various civic organizations 
                                                 
7 Jeanette Westfall to Kay Schlacks, December 3, 1968 - ISU MS 034 Box 18 Folder 1. 
8 This thesis draws upon the definitions of “informal empire” and “contact zones” laid out in Gilbert Joseph, “Close 
Encounters: Toward a New Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations” in Close Encounters of Empire: 
Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations ed. Gilbert Joseph, Catherine LeGrand, and Ricardo 
D. Salvatore (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 3-46. Joseph’s work defines the United States’ imperialism as 
a dynamic constantly produced through cultural and political ‘encounters.’ 
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into their projects and avoid the bureaucratic challenges of international development and 
diplomatic border-crossing. As the caravanning incident illustrates, the blending of tourism and 
development often had a covert purpose. Moving development supplies under the cover of 
civilian identity and tourist activity subverted the import-restricting development policies of the 
Mexican government, which the Americans viewed as obstructive and limiting. The Partners 
wished to transform Yucatán, a state historically isolated from the rest of Mexico, into a modern 
state and promote the region as an ancient, exotic place that could draw international tourism, 
believing that these measures would stabilize the economy and lessen the perceived communist 
threat in the region. These goals reflected how American citizens saw themselves in Latin 
America, paternalistically driven to impose their visions of modernity and antiquity onto 
Mexico’s countryside and its people. While the growing field of tourist studies has recognized 
how closely tourism and development interlinked during the twentieth century, few works have 
discussed development experts as tourists, or how the touristic appeal of “exotic” sites has driven 
the movement of experts into certain regions like the Yucatán Peninsula. The tourist-technician 
strategy and the Iowa-Yucatán Partners’ projects illustrate how civilian diplomacy and 
development methods adopted during the Cold War blended identities of “citizen,” “consumer,” 
and “expert” in ways that furthered the United States’ informal political and cultural authority.9 
                                                 
9 The study of tourism and tourist-oriented development is growing quickly. Within the recent literature on twentieth 
century American tourism, there appear consistent central themes of cultural and economic imperialism and Cold 
War diplomacy. Recent scholars studying American Cold War tourism have suggested that Americans abroad were 
driven by the desire to present a self-conscious image of the United States as racially- and culturally-tolerant while 
also interpreting non-American peoples and spaces as inherently backward, deficient, and “underdeveloped.” The 
exoticizing and paternalistic treatment of non-Western cultures is famously laid out in Edward Said, Orientalism 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). For recent examples of how historians discuss tourism in the context of 
globalism and American imperialism, see Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow 
Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); and Christine Skwiot, The Purposes of 
Paradise: U.S. Tourism in Cuba and Hawai’i (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). For a study of 
tourism, modernization, and US-Mexican relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, see Jason Ruiz, 
Americans in the Treasure House: Travel to Porfirian Mexico and the Cultural Politics of Empire (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2014). While Ruiz’s work focuses on the period of Porfirio Diaz’s rule (1887-1911) in 
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The Partners’ civilian members helped to perpetuate an American informal empire in 
Latin America that was most overtly powerful and visible at the level of federal policy. The 
Alliance for Progress was spearheaded by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 as a hemispheric 
effort to promote economic and social development in the Americas and curb the perceived rise 
of communism in Latin America. At the time, Latin American and U.S. politicians alike 
criticized the Alliance for Progress for its emphasis on large-scale infrastructural projects and 
unclear goals. Most famously, Chilean president Eduardo Frei Montalva wrote a critical article 
on the Alliance for Progress in 1967, stressing that “one of the most serious criticisms of the 
Alliance [is] that the people have not been able to participate in it.”10 The United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) developed the civilian-led structure of the Partners of 
the Alliance in response to this type of ideological and practical critique of the Alliance. The 
Partners of the Alliance intended to address these criticisms by focusing civic interest and 
expertise on small-scale development by pairing state-level chapters in the United States and 
Latin American countries.11  Iowa’s partnership with Yucatán produces a useful case study of the 
                                                 
Mexico, his study establishes that the process of modernization and infrastructure-building in the early twentieth 
century allowed for increased American access and exposure to Mexico and these tourists developed a belief that 
foreign intervention by the United States would lead to Mexico to a desirable state of modernity. Ruiz’ argument 
that the exceptional appeal of Mexico was its mixture of familiar modernity and exotic antiquity is particularly 
relevant to this study of Yucatán’s tourist appeal in the post-war period (Ruiz, Americans in the Treasure House, 54-
55).  
10 Eduardo Frei Montalva, “Urgencies in Latin America: The Alliance that Lost its Way,” Foreign Affairs (April 
1967). 
11 Other partnerships through the Partners of the Americas have followed different historical paths. For example, a 
close and lasting relationship formed between civilian diplomats in Wisconsin and Nicaragua through the Partners of 
the Alliance in 1964. Growing discontent within the Partners chapter in Wisconsin led to a split in the early 1980s, 
because the Wisconsin-Nicaragua Partners promoted an officially ‘apolitical’ stance on partisan issues in their 
partner country. Those members who openly criticized policies to funnel aid toward “right-wing opposition” formed 
the independent Wisconsin Coordinating Council on Nicaragua (WCCN) to educate the American public about U.S. 
foreign policy in Nicaragua. While the WCCN continued to use the language of citizen diplomacy and draw upon 
the principles of the Alliance for Progress, the Council heavily criticized the Partners’ claim to ‘neutrality’ as 
inconsistent and inaccurate. For more information on this alternative path for the Partners, see Clare Weber, Visions 
of Solidarity: Peace Activists in Nicaragua from War to Women’s Activism and Globalization (New York: 
Lexington Books, 2006). Further research is needed to know the breadth and variety of experiences within the 
Partners system, given that there were eventually at least 40 Partners chapters in the United States. 
6 
 
 
transnational coordination of expertise and resources in Mexico, a nation where Cold War 
historians have often overlooked the impact of the Alliance for Progress.12 The Iowa-Yucatán 
Partners illustrate how civilians used their private status to transform local conditions while 
upholding the disproportionate political and economic power of the United States in Latin 
America.  
                                                 
12 Renata Keller, Mexico’s Cold War: Cuba, the United States, and the Legacy of the Mexican Revolution (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 135-136. Keller mentions the general agreement between President 
Kennedy and President López Mateos over the tenets of the Alliance for Progress amidst tense negotiations over 
Cuba. 
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CHAPTER 2. HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Given the contentious nature of the international role of American citizens, the issue of 
civilian diplomacy remains an understudied element of American Cold War policy, especially in 
regards to the Alliance for Progress. Historical study of the Alliance for Progress has focused on 
the ideology and strategies of Kennedy and Johnson’s presidential administrations and the U.S. 
Department of State, often contrasted with the more civilian-focused activities of the Peace 
Corps.13 Major works on the Alliance for Progress in recent years have focused particularly on 
the ideological underpinnings of Kennedy’s 1961 pledge to the countries of Latin America and 
how that has shaped American influences on the Western Hemisphere. Stephen Rabe’s work, for 
example, asserts that President Kennedy and Johnson’s policies prioritized the strength and 
stability of anticommunist governments in the Americas over democratic ideals.14 Likewise, 
Michael Latham’s book Modernization as Ideology limits its focus to the actions of the executive 
office and its policymakers. While Latham discusses the role of informal networks of expertise 
within President Kennedy’s advisors, his chapter on the Alliance for Progress does not address 
how “deeply rooted cultural assumptions about America’s ability to project a nation-building 
power” could shape civilians as well as government policymakers.15 This recent body of work on 
                                                 
13 There have been several recent works which have discussed the Peace Corps as part of U.S. foreign policy. For 
example, see Michael Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the 
Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). Latham contrasts the Alliance for 
Progress’ focus on government-level reform and funding, where the Peace Corps represents the citizen involvement 
aspect of the Kennedy administration’s policies on modernization. For further reading on the history of civilian 
activity in the Peace Corps, see Elizabeth Cobb Hoffman, All You Need is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of 
the 1960s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); and Molly Geidel, Peace Corps Fantasies: How 
Development Shaped the Global Sixties (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015). 
14 Stephen Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in 
Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 196-198. 
15Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 70. One should also note that Latham’s work, and much of the work on the 
Alliance for Progress is fixated on the Kennedy administration, but discuss in much less detail the Alliance during 
Johnson and Nixon’s time in office. One exception is Jeffrey Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance 
for Progress in Latin America (New York: Routledge Press, 2007). This work discusses the continuities of foreign 
aid strategies from Eisenhower to Nixon and the Alliance’s shift towards more pragmatic policies during the 
Johnson administration. This discussion includes a brief mention of the Partners of the Alliance, describing the 
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U.S. foreign policy in the 1960s does not closely investigate the practical execution of the 
Alliance programs, tending to focus on “government-to-government” interactions, especially 
during the Kennedy administration.16 Recent works on the Peace Corps, which do emphasize 
civilian development activity, are largely focused on the Corps’ traditional demographic: young 
college students who were able to spend several years at a single development site. By contrast, 
Partners of the Alliance activity was carried out by a broad cross-section of the American 
civilian population, who had a variety of interests, resources, and levels of expertise. Further 
exploration of how civilians of many ages and vocations shaped the nature of transnational 
development reveals a more multifaceted view of American development activity in the Cold 
War than previous works on the Alliance for Progress and Peace Corps programs. 
Historians of development, relief, and humanitarianism around the world have raised 
similar questions on the ideology and practice of civilian outreach, tracing a continuous growth 
in civic involvement over the course of the twentieth century. For example, Bruno Cabanes 
argues that beginning in the First World War, U.S. citizens interpreted food donations to relief 
efforts in famine- and war-stricken regions as their personal contribution to America’s 
international relations and the food itself as a “weapon against Communism.”17 With the 
emergence of Cold War competition for international power and legitimacy, this civilian 
                                                 
program as a publicity-seeking venture to attract support for the Alliance (Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 
45). 
16 Two thesis projects on the Partners of the Alliance for Progress were produced while the publicly-sponsored 
program was still active in the early 1970s. These studies focused largely on the national coordination of the 
Partners program and Boren’s role in guiding the state-level chapters. Both works take a “birds-eye view” of the 
program, emphasizing its self-help approach, but fails to address the historical context of the program or the roles of 
civilian participants at the state level. Also, as both works were completed by 1971, they were unable to discuss the 
Partners’ development into a private program, which was an important shift in their identity. Rosemary J. Winslow, 
“Partners of the Alliance, Inc: The grassroots approach to the Alliance for Progress,” (Master’s thesis, University of 
Maine, 1970); and William P. Avery, “The Partners of the Alliance: aspects of private participation in inter-
American relations” (Master’s thesis, University of Tennessee, 1971).  
17 Bruno Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918-1924 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 208-10. 
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involvement grew increasingly valuable to the federal government. President Dwight 
Eisenhower promoted people-to-people diplomatic programs as a way to bolster Americans’ 
national pride and anti-communist beliefs. This blending of international humanitarianism with 
anti-communist nationalism was almost certainly no less intense among Americans in the wake 
of the 1959 Cuban Revolution.18 In fact, historian Michael Barnett links the Cold War with 
international aid activities and organizations that prioritized “nationalism, development, and 
sovereignty,” arguing that post-war humanitarian agencies and their civilian participants were 
often driven by the belief that crisis and ‘underdevelopment’ around the world threatened the 
security of the American nation-state. American expertise and foreign aid were viewed as tools 
of national security, as “development and modernization became intertwined in doctrines of 
anticommunism.”19  
Global histories of the Cold War have also explored the ideological and political motives 
of scientific outreach and civilian experts.20 Nick Cullather and Christopher Sneddon have 
discussed the United States’ global efforts to impose expertise and remake landscapes in 
politically sensitive regions. These works explicitly describe development as foreign policy 
carried out by networks of civilian experts and diplomats alike to transform the politics, 
economy, biology, and infrastructure of “undeveloped” nations.21 In order to achieve these 
                                                 
18 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2006). 
19 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 9, 
104-106. 
20 In the last decade, historians of the Cold War have increasingly adopted transnational and global lenses, arguing 
that previous historical study has excessively emphasized bilateral conflict between the United States and Soviet 
Union. Many of these histories have since argued that American and Soviet interventionism in other regions was 
driven by the Cold War geopolitical context. For the definitive work on interventionism and adopting a global 
approach to the Cold War, see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making 
of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
21 Christopher Sneddon, Concrete Revolution: Large Dams, Cold War Geopolitics, and the US Bureau of 
Reclamation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); and Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold 
War Battle against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
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transformations, development experts of the post-war period relied on strategies that blended 
international “universal” expertise with localized knowledge. For example, historians Donna 
Mehos and Suzanne Moon have asserted that post-war global experts formed partnerships with 
institutions and experts in developing countries in order to provide local knowledge to make their 
projects more effective.22 Partnership between global experts and local representatives had the 
practical value of sustaining the development process after experts had moved on and the 
political value of appearing more inclusive and equitable than simply imposing development by 
sheer force or will. The conclusions of these global histories of aid and international expertise 
invite study on small-scale civilian partnerships that spanned across national borders.23 As the 
Iowa-Yucatán Partners illustrate, the cultural and political context of the Cold War motivated 
citizens to participate in global networks of expertise, networking, and institution-building. The 
activities and ideals of these civilian diplomats can give historians a more granular sense of how 
negotiations for national power were experienced by individuals and small communities. 
Studying the Iowa-Yucatán Partners of the Alliance illustrates the significance of 
commodity movement and knowledge exchange to local civilians’ experiences within the realm 
of international relations. As noted above, the Partners’ activities can be understood through the 
lens of “informal empire,” in which the United States exerted intense cultural, political, and 
economic power on regional government actors and citizens, but without asserting formal 
                                                 
22 Donna Mehos and Suzanne Moon, “The Uses of Portability: Circulating Experts in the Technopolitics of the Cold 
War and Decolonization,” in Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Cold War, ed. Gabrielle 
Hecht (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 43-74. A similar concept of partnering governmental and technical 
institutions in developed and developing nations was introduced in 1984 in a technical paper by Lauren E. Cooper, 
“The Twinning of Institutions: Its Use as a Technical Assistance Delivery System” World Bank technical paper, no. 
WTP 23 (Washington, DC: The WorldBank, 1984). 
23 The field of religious and missionary outreach has examined the issue of civilian cultural exchange and the 
negotiation for power. For a focused and detailed study of how missionaries and local indigenous people negotiated 
for power and experienced the process of international development during the Cold War, see Susan Fitzpatrick-
Behrens, Maryknoll Catholic Mission in Peru, 1943-1989: Transnational Faith and Transformation (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2012). 
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sovereignty.24 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American politicians and 
investors had established this type of power within the Yucatán Peninsula to sustain henequen 
production, a raw material for binder twine which was integral to American wheat-processing. 
Studies of informal empire in the Yucatán region have therefore fixed on the commodity-export 
dynamic established by American agribusinesses and how the movement of those goods linked 
Yucatán into broader systems of trade and international power during the early twentieth century. 
This focus has led most historians to conclude their analysis at the precipitous decline of the 
henequen industry in the 1930s to 1950s. The links between the Yucatán Peninsula and the 
United States, however, persisted beyond this downturn in trade.25 In the tense political climate 
of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers saw exerting their cultural and economic influence on 
Yucatán and its citizens as a viable strategy for containing communism. Once again, the 
movement of commodities sustained America’s informal political influence over this Mexican 
region. In this case, however, the commodities were flowing south rather than north. Border-
crossing, private networking, and touristic appeal became tools for American civilians, like those 
in the Iowa-Yucatán Partners program, to spread their development supplies. The Partners 
                                                 
24 The literature on informal empire in Latin America is extensive, ranging across the entire region and the entire 
post-colonial historical period. While the term was initially applied to Latin America in relation to its trade with the 
British empire, multiple scholars of Mexican and Latin American history have referred to the United States’ efforts 
to build hemispheric power through economic and cultural dominance in the nineteenth and twentieth as ‘informal 
empire.’ For further reading on the subject in relation to Yucatecan commodity production, see Gilbert M. Joseph, 
Revolution from Without: Yucatán, Mexico, and the United States, 1880-1924 (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1998); and The Second Conquest of Latin America: Coffee, Henequen, and Oil during the Export Boom, 1850-1930, 
ed. Stephen Topik and Allen Wells (Austin: University of Texas, Austin Press, 1998).  
25Allen Wells, Yucatán’s Gilded Age: Haciendas, Henequen, and International Harvester, 1860-1915 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985); and Sterling Evans, Bound in Twine: The History and 
Ecology of the Henequen-Wheat Complex for Mexico and the American and Canadian Plains, 1880-1950 (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007). Though they choose slightly different end points during Yucatán’s 
history, both works focus on the intense monopolistic production of henequen in the Yucatán Peninsula, as it defined 
the region’s relationship to the rest of the Mexico and the United States. Both authors conclude their works by 
arguing that new competitors in the global fiber market displaced its relationship with its trading partners and 
destabilized the region’s export-reliant economy. 
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therefore acted as agents of the United States’ informal empire by upholding a long-standing 
system of environmental, economic and political control over the Yucatán Peninsula. 
Close examination of documents from the American side of the Partners provides insight 
into this process of negotiated influence and informal imperialism. Records from the Iowa 
Partners of the Alliance and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
reveal that American citizens interpreted the “mutual self-help” aims of the Partners organization 
in ways which rarely considered Yucatecan perspectives on development. These archival 
collections do not contain much material focused on the Yucatán Partners or the Mexican 
recipients of development projects, and therefore their perspectives must be represented here 
largely through moments and spaces of contact with the Iowa Partners, the U.S. Consulate, and 
USAID, who largely viewed Yucatecans through a paternalistic and exoticized lens. This 
precludes comprehensive study of the Partner states of Tabasco, Campeche, and Quintana Roo, 
which received relatively little attention from the American side. Partners in the United States 
tended to interact mostly with Yucatán Partners who were perceived to have local authority and 
who wished to direct resources into their own work for the purpose of regional development. In 
many cases, Iowans and Yucatecan elites shared goals, such as developing tourism and 
agricultural diversification, which did not consider the needs or interests of rural, poor and 
indigenous Yucatecans. These few glimpses reveal how the complex political and social 
conditions within the Yucatán Peninsula helped shape the policies and strategies of the Iowa-
Yucatán Partners program.  
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CHAPTER 3. THE POWER OF PEOPLE: EMERGENCE OF THE CIVILIAN PARTNERSHIP 
MODEL 
The Partners of the Alliance for Progress emerged as a multi-pronged and flexible 
solution to the inefficient and overly-bureaucratized administration of the Alliance for 
Progress.26 The Partners’ oft-repeated origin story suggests that its civilian development model 
sprang fully-formed into the mind of its administrator. While riding in the back of a truck in Peru 
in 1963, USAID coordinator James Boren arrived at the idea that the Alliance administrators’ 
efforts to complete projects could be improved through the practice of “mutual self-help.”27 The 
agency needed to corral the civic resources of the United States and Latin America, whose 
civilian participants could coordinate small-scale transnational projects without significant 
federal involvement.  
In fact, Boren believed such an approach had strategic and political advantages. This 
structure would allow for numerous small-scale projects, instead of relying on high-profile and 
high-cost infrastructural projects. Boren promoted a “mutual self-help” approach as more 
practical and more equitable than the federal sector of the Alliance for Progress. USAID 
administrators argued that a program with a “two-way nature” would allow the United States to 
provide aid and modernizing technologies, while Latin American states could provide cultural 
                                                 
26 Interestingly, the Peace Corps, the development program known for its civilian involvement, also attempted to 
form a similar partnership and exchange structure in 1967. The Peace Corps administration proposed creating a 
Volunteers to America program. The program was designed to allow young people from developing countries 
around the world interested in community service and education to come to the United States to provide services, 
often as a component of domestic American anti-poverty programs. The program ended in 1970 after the Peace 
Corps funding bill was amended to prohibit use of funding to bring volunteers to the United States. “64 Volunteers 
to U.S. Begin their Training,” The Washington Post, July 25, 1967; “Volunteers from Abroad,” Volunteer 6 no. 9 
(July/August 1968); House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Survey of Activities of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
House of Representatives, January 3, 1969 – January 2, 1971, 91st Cong., 1971, 19. 
27 “A Special Performance of Traditional Dances,” The News, March 16, 1967. Many documents from both the 
national and state-level Partners use the term in their publications, particularly press releases and Congressional 
statements. 
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and educational experiences to Americans.28 This system complemented the United States’ 
continued endorsements of “self-help” in Latin American development, expressed through the 
Act of Bogotá under President Eisenhower, the Charter of Punta del Este under President 
Kennedy, and the theories of Walt Rostow, President Kennedy’s influential economic and policy 
advisor.29 Rostow argued that the United States needed to provide technical and economic aid to 
help “transition” developing countries into an American-style industrial capitalist democracy, 
stimulating developing nations’ interest in “self-help.”30 Thus, Kennedy introduced programs 
like the Alliance for Progress and Peace Corps, both of which were intended to provide nations 
and communities the resources needed to modernize according to the U.S. example. 
Boren’s proposal to the Alliance for Progress administration argued that the development 
process could be presented as a mutually-beneficial and equitable partnership between the United 
States and Latin American countries and avoid criticisms that the Alliance for Progress was 
condescending and paternalistic. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann, lead coordinator of 
the federal Alliance for Progress program, approved Boren’s proposal to administrate the 
Partners of the Alliance for Progress through USAID in October 1964, marking the official 
founding of the program.31 With these federal administrative resources, the Partners of the 
Alliance for Progress could now foster support for “mutual self-help” partnerships across the 50 
American states and countless provinces and states in Latin American nations. 
                                                 
28 Cong. Rec, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 15, pt. 24: 32969-32970. 
29 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Punta del Este Conference, January 1962: Report of Senators Wayne 
Morse and Bourke B. Hickenlooper to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. 87th Cong. 2nd 
sess., March 5, 1962, 7-16 
30Michael Latham, Modernization as Ideology; Kimber Charles Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy and the Rhetoric of 
Foreign Aid (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 2001); John Lodewijks, “Rostow, Developing Economies 
and National Security Policy,” in Economics and National Security: A History of their Interaction, ed. Craufurd 
D.W. Goodwin (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991); and W.W. Rostow, View from the Seventh Floor (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1964). 
31 Tad Szulo, “U.S. Sends Latins Grass-Roots Aid,” New York Times, October 11, 1964. 
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The Partners of the Alliance administrators believed that their program’s strength was its 
ground-level focus on carrying out many projects simultaneously, which would increase their 
visibility and allow for greater civilian engagement. In their first Partners newsletter, the 
national Partners of the Alliance organization announced that “100 small projects are preferable 
to one large program” because they would elicit broader public engagement with the Alliance.32 
This approach responded to the common criticism of that the Alliance for Progress was too 
focused on the federal level and complemented President Johnson’s notion that the United States 
“must bring to bear on the problems of the developing world the knowledge and skills…of 
people from all walks of American life.”33 The Partners regularly stressed that the “major 
resource U.S. Partners [could] supply is U.S. expertise,” channeled into regions of Latin America 
where “progressive elements” requested help. USAID saw the “Partners as a flexible mechanism 
to try out new techniques, devices, unique approaches.” 34 James Boren presented this model as a 
way to experiment with modernizing techniques, so that civilian development teams could 
achieve “immediate visible progress” that would “buy time in Latin America for the longer term, 
impersonal government activity aimed at institution-building.”35 Projects like “completing a one-
room schoolhouse in a small village or getting a tractor for a farm cooperative,” though modest 
in monetary value, legitimized the presence of American citizens in Latin America as experts. 
Civilians in the Partners propagated the informal technical and political power of the United 
States within important communities and regions of Latin America. James Boren described the 
                                                 
32 “32 State Partnerships Working with Latin American Nations” Partners Newsletter, 1967 - ISU MS 034 Box 4, 
Folder 1. 
33 “Johnson’s Message to Congress, Outlining His 1966 Foreign Assistance Program,” New York Times, January 15, 
1965. 
34 “32 State Partnerships Working with Latin American Nations” Partners Newsletter, 1967 - ISU MS 034 Box 4, 
Folder 1. 
35 James Boren, “Toward a Nation-Based Aid Program: Businessmen, Communities, and Local Governments as Aid 
Donors,” June 15, 1964 - National Archives UD WW 1174 Carton 125 Folder Partners of the Alliance 1963-66. 
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effectiveness of civilian diplomacy with an electoral metaphor, “to really get people involved 
you’ve got to go to the grass roots level, like putting a roof on a guy’s house. Look, you let me 
organize the precincts, I’ll win the election.”36 The Partners of the Alliance for Progress emerged 
in 1964 with the belief that civilian diplomats would be able to effect real political change 
through their ability to network, build professional ties and friendships, and their ability as 
private citizens to bypass bureaucratic and political obstacles.  
                                                 
36 Gordon Chaplin, “The Red Tape Baron,” The Washington Post, February 23, 1975. 
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CHAPTER 4. “AN AREA SEETHING WITH SUBVERSION”: INSTABILITY AND 
INTERDEPENDENCE IN YUCATÁN 
The Partners of the Alliance, and the Alliance for Progress more broadly, wanted to 
establish positive relations with regions which were perceived to be vulnerable to communist 
threats and economic instability, such as the Yucatán Peninsula. American diplomats and 
developers shared an interest in grassroots development and intervention on the Yucatán 
Peninsula, in part because of its proximity to communist Cuba and its economic and political 
instability. This section will briefly discuss the political conditions and concerns which drove the 
United States’ promotion of the Partners’ program in Yucatán.  
Mexico’s resistance to official American development efforts likely made the civilian 
focus and rhetoric of “mutual self-help” of the Partners seem appropriate to bolster relations in 
the valuable Yucatán region. The American interest in the Yucatan Peninsula was fueled in part 
by the Mexican government’s relative disinterest in the development programs promoted by 
Kennedy’s administration, such as the Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps. Cold War 
historian Renata Keller has observed that Mexico used a continued diplomatic relationship with 
post-revolutionary Cuba to retain its sovereignty and autonomy from American political 
influence and economic dominance.37 Mexican President Adolfo López Mateos was therefore 
hesitant to participate in the Alliance for Progress and wished to “deflect US interference” 
because it believed the Alliance’s “mechanisms of co-ordination…were too intrusive.”38 At the 
                                                 
37 Renata Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, and Renata Keller, “A Foreign Policy for Domestic Consumption: Mexico’s 
Lukewarm Defense of Castro, 1959–1969,” Latin American Research Review 47 no. 2 (2012): 100-119. Keller 
asserts that part of this political maneuvering included drawing on Mexico’s revolutionary history and rhetoric to 
defend Mexico’s continued links to Cuba. Mexican politics were dominated for much of the twentieth century by the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and PRI derived enormous political cachet from their historical association 
with the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920). For further reading on this subject, see Thomas Benjamin, La 
Revolución: Mexico’s Great Revolution as Memory, Myth, and History (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010). 
38 Vanni Pettinà, “Global Horizons: Mexico, the Third World, and the Non-Aligned Movement at the Time of the 
1961 Belgrade Conference,” The International History Review 38, no. 4 (2016): 743. 
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same time, the Mexican government also declined to invite Peace Corps volunteers into the 
country as representatives of American expertise and cultural influence.39 Though Mexican 
officials rejected the Peace Corps’ overt civilian interventionism, Presidents Kennedy and Lopez 
Mateos generally agreed that economic development and improved cultural relations would 
benefit the US-Mexico relationship.40 The Partners of the Alliance, who stressed a goal of 
“friendship” between civilian communities, may have appeared sufficiently un-intrusive to 
escape the disapproval of the Mexican government and was therefore able to pursue their 
development goals in Yucatán.41  
Yucatán’s long-standing political instability, unusual environment, and distinctive racial 
make-up created a highly interdependent relationship with the United States, the Caribbean and 
Central America and limited Yucatán’s connections to the rest of Mexico. Located at the very 
southeastern edge of Mexico, the Yucatán Peninsula was an exceptional region, isolated from the 
broader national economy and culture from independence onward. During the Mexican War of 
Independence in the 1810s, the Yucatán region had formed a sovereign state, the Republic of 
Yucatán, which later joined the Mexican federated states. The Republic again withdrew from 
Mexico in 1840, only to experience a lengthy and brutal Caste War from 1847 to 1901. This 
conflict arose over the desire of Yucatán’s Mayan population for autonomy from the local 
mestizo elite, whose interest in henequen production threatened indigenous communal land 
                                                 
39 Elizabeth Cobb Hoffman, All You Need is Love, 66. Relatively unique within Latin America, the Mexican 
government refused to allow Peace Corps volunteers to establish a permanent presence in Mexico until 2004. 
40 Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 135-136. 
41 Much of the Partners of the Alliance public rhetoric stresses the importance of friendship to their goals. For 
example, Partners President William Brown proclaimed that the primary purpose of the Iowa-Yucatán Partners 
organization was to maintain “bonds of friendship” between Mexican and American people. William Brown, 
“Resolution by President William Brown,” June 30 1970 – ISU MS 034 Box 4 Folder 1. 
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ownership.42 After the Mexican military forcibly ended the Caste War by taking Yucatán’s 
capital, Mérida, in 1915, Governor Salvador Alvarado implemented reforms to improve political, 
economic and social conditions for working and indigenous peoples and regulate the powers of 
the local henequen-producers.43  
In both practical and cultural terms, the Yucatán Peninsula of the twentieth century was 
largely defined by its isolation from Mexico. While it had its own rail system, the Yucatán 
Peninsula was not integrated into the standardized national rail system until 1957 and the 
Mexican highway system did not reach Yucatán until 1961.44 The Peninsula’s economic activity 
therefore relied heavily on transporting goods to the United States by the Gulf of Mexico and 
island states by the Caribbean Sea. As noted in a 1969 State Department briefing, “Yucatán has 
always looked more toward the U.S., Cuba and Europe than toward the Mexican heartland.”45 
Yucatán was, in fact, intimately tied to the American heartland through commodities that linked 
the two regions’ economy and environment.  
Yucatán’s regionalism and unique cultural and geographic conditions attracted a great 
deal of interest from Americans who wished to develop a model for modernizing remote and 
indigenous communities. For example, in the early 1920s, the Rockefeller Foundation 
coordinated with Mexico’s federal government and Yucatán’s state officials in their campaigns 
to eradicate tropical diseases in Maya communities and make the region more appealing to 
                                                 
42 There is a good deal of recent historical research on the subject of the Caste War of Yucatán, its precursors and its 
historical consequences. For further reading on this subject, see Nelson A. Reed, The Caste War of Yucatán 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); and Terry Rugeley, Yucatán’s Maya Peasantry and the Origins of the 
Caste War (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010). 
43 Edward Moseley and Helen Delpar, “Yucatán’s Prelude to Globalization,” in Yucatán in an Era of Globalization, 
ed. Eric N. Baklanoff and Edward H. Moseley (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2008), 21-40. 
44 Jeffery Brannon and Eric Baklanoff, Agrarian Reform and Public Enterprise in Mexico: The Political Economy of 
Yucatán’s Henequen Industry (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987). 
45 Amembassy Mexico, US Government, “Airgram A-445 from Amembassy Mexico to the Department of State 
August 19, 1969” National Security Database, George Washington University, 12. 
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investors.46 Yucatán’s prominent Mayan population drew the interest of American scholars 
throughout the twentieth century. In 1950, 48 percent of the state’s population spoke Yucatec-
Maya.47 The Carnegie Institution established their Mayan Research Project in 1913 to study 
Yucatán and Guatemala’s indigenous communities. Through this project, anthropologist Robert 
Redfield produced the now-classic regional study Chan Kom: A Maya Village in 1934. From this 
study, Redfield and his colleagues began to develop the concept of “acculturation,” asserting that 
small indigenous communities peacefully transition into the modern economy through existing 
traditions of industrious and communally-oriented behavior.48 The decades of research done by 
the Carnegie program, while shaping American scholarship on modernization and community 
traditions, also labelled Yucatán as a source of knowledge on cultures perceived as exotic or 
primitive.49 
Part of Yucatán’s political and economic instability derived not just from its remote 
location but the exceptional nature of the Peninsula’s environment within Mexico. Henequen had 
been a miracle crop for Yucatán, uniquely suited to its unusual ‘karst’ topography and climate.50 
The region contained no major rivers; its rainfall was not retained by the rocky and thin soil, but 
                                                 
46 Heather McCrea, Diseased Relations: Epidemics, Public Health, and State-Building in Yucatán, Mexico, 1847-
1924 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 2011); and David Sowell, “Multiple Colonizations, State 
Formation, Public Health, and the Yucatec Maya, 1891-1960,” in Crossing Colonial Historiographies: Histories of 
Colonial and Indigenous Medicines in Transnational Perspective ed. Anne Digby and Waltraud Ernst (New York: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 77-98. 
47 Paul Sullivan, “The Yucatec Maya,” in Supplement to the Handbook of Middle American Indians, Volume 6: 
Ethnology ed. John Monaghan and Barbara Edmonson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), 207-223. 
48 Robert Redfield, Chan Kom, A Maya Village (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1934); and Robert Redfield, A 
Village that Chose Progress: Chan Kom Revisited (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950). Several works 
have discussed the relationship of this research in the Yucatán Peninsula to American attitudes towards global 
development and modernization. For further information, see Daniel Immerwahr, Thinking Small: The United States 
and the Lure of Community Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015); and Clifford Wilcox, Social 
Anthropology: Robert Redfield (New York: Routledge Press, 2017). 
49 Paul Sullivan, Unfinished Conversations: Mayas and Foreigners Between Two Wars (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1991). 
50 John Gunn, Encyclopedia of Caves and Karst Science (New York, NY: Routledge Press, 2004), 70-75. A karst 
topography is characterized by a bedrock that has been degraded by acidic water and soil that is highly-permeable, 
allowing for the formation of sinkholes, underground caves, and underwater drainage systems. 
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accumulated in underground caverns called cenotes, making irrigation a particular challenge in 
Yucatecan agriculture. Henequen, a hardy and deep-rooted agave plant, thrived on the 
Peninsula’s mineral-rich calcareous earth and needed little water to survive.51 The plant’s fibers 
could be spun into binder twine for wheat-binding machinery, which made it a valuable 
commodity to the mechanizing wheat farms of the American and Canadian Great Plains. To 
meet the growing henequen fiber demand of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
expansive plantations called haciendas cleared the vegetative mosaic of the region to maximize 
henequen production.52  The North American Great Plains and Yucatán Peninsula merged into an 
interdependent environmental and economic exchange, forming what Sterling Evans has termed 
a “henequen-wheat complex”53 But as American wheat farms began to adopt the use of 
combines, and later synthetic binding fibers, demand for Yucatán’s primary cash crop plunged in 
the 1940s and 1950s. The Mexican federal government created a state-sponsored binder twine 
industrial corporation called “Cordemex” to bolster the regional economy in 1961. 54 The 
advancement and mechanization of American agriculture freed the United States from economic 
interdependence with the Yucatán Peninsula. Despite the Mexican government’s efforts, Yucatán 
was seriously destabilized by the loss of American demand which had reshaped its economy and 
environment. 
In addition to the region’s economic problems, Yucatán’s relationship to the federal 
Mexican government during the 1960s grew increasingly distant and antagonistic. Corrupt state 
and local officials in Yucatán had failed to complete a public water infrastructure project, 
causing the state to default on an Inter-American Development Bank loan. As punishment for 
                                                 
51 Sterling Evans, Bound in Twine, 33-34.  
52 ibid., 47-48. 
53 ibid., 32-35. 
54 Evans, Bound in Twine, 226-228. 
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this inefficiency and corruption, the national government temporarily withdrew funding and 
support for public works in the early 1960s.55 Amidst these clashes between federal and state 
authorities, Yucatán’s rural peasantry and Maya population came to support for the National 
Action Party (PAN), a Catholic and socially-conservative political party which opposed the 
policies and political control of the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).56 American 
foreign intelligence reports from the mid-1960s suggested that Yucatecan peasants’ support for 
the PAN was driven by a growing frustration with the state government’s continued fixation on 
henequen production and allegiance to the federally-controlled and undemocratic PRI.57 
These experiences in the early 1960s left Yucatecans isolated from the rest of Mexico, 
financially imperiled by the collapsing henequen market, and unhappy with the national control 
of their regional politics, which was all the more concerning to American analysts because of the 
Peninsula’s proximity to Cuba and the revolutionary activity brewing in Guatemala and 
Nicaragua during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1961, New York Times correspondent Paul Kennedy 
reported that the Mexican military was patrolling the coastline of the Yucatán Peninsula to fend 
off guerilla activity or training, claiming that “the core of the [1959] Castro invasion movement 
                                                 
55 Amembassy Mexico, US Government. “Airgram A-445 from Amembassy Mexico to the Department of State 
August 19, 1969” National Security Database, George Washington University, 8; and Donald Mabry, Mexico’s 
Accion Nacional: A Catholic Alternative to Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1973) 83. The name of 
para-state industrial enterprise Cordemex was ordinarily styled as ‘CORDEMEX’ in print. 
56 The PRI was founded in the 1930s to institutionalize the policies of the Mexican Revolution and controlled the 
federal government through its party machinery. Through mass media, appeals to a “revolutionary mythos,” and 
outright voting fraud, the PRI maintained a stronghold over Mexico’s federal, state and local electoral politics for 
decades and dictated the policy positions of candidates from the centralized hub of the president’s office in Mexico 
City. Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 17-18. 
57 Amembassy Mexico, US Government. “Airgram A-445 from Amembassy Mexico to the Department of State 
August 19, 1969” National Security Database, George Washington University. Resistance to PRI’s political 
authoritarianism would lead to a cycle of indigenous pro-left and Catholic-organized political protests in the 1970s 
in many parts of Mexico, though Yucatán, Tabasco, and Campeche experience only low levels of protest. The low-
level of indigenous collective political activity is a trend which Shannan Mattiace attributes to the conservativism of 
the Catholic Church in Yucatán and the weakness of peasant worker political associations in the state.  See 
Guillermo Trejo, Popular Movements in Autocracies: Religion, Repression and Indigenous Collective Action in 
Mexico (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 62-63; and Shannan Mattiace, “Ethnic Mobilization among 
the Maya of Yucatán Today,” Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies 4 no. 2 (2009): 137-169. 
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was launched from the peninsula.”58 In 1964, AID administrator Frank Coffin noted that “the 
threat of Cuba [was] pointed like a saber at the Yucatán Peninsula.” By Coffin’s analysis, 
influencing the political loyalties of the Yucatán Peninsula and Central America was an urgent 
priority for the United States. If this area could “develop constructively,” it would allow the 
United States to maintain its own national security and its relationships within the Western 
Hemisphere. If the region were instead captured by communist subversives, it would “sever” the 
hemisphere’s political unity and become a “beachhead for operations both north and south.” 59 
The threat of Yucatán’s instability seemed to loom large in the minds of USAID administrators.  
Even before the Partners program was officially initiated, the Iowa chapter of the Partners 
struggled to balance its partnership between powerful institutions and the regional populace 
within a divided Yucatán Peninsula. Shortly after Iowa and Yucatán formed their official 
connection, Partners director Jim Boren and USAID administrator Ted Tenorio expressed a 
mutual concern that Iowa had been drawn to Yucatán as a potential partner by representatives of 
the para-state henequen corporation Cordemex. The administrators expressed concern because 
some degree of “enmity existed between [Cordemex] and the governments” of Yucatán and 
Tabasco.60 Political analysts in Mexico also noted this conflict, stating that the federally-funded 
Agrarian Bank and Cordemex were suspected of corruption and its leaders were termed 
“Mexicans and not Yucatecans” by peasants.61 The internal conflicts and issues within the 
                                                 
58 Paul Kennedy, “Mexico Guards Against Cubans: Yucatán Patrol Aims to Halt Any Moves by Castro’s Forces or 
His Foes,” New York Times, January 22, 1961. It is unclear what formed the basis for Kennedy’s claim about 
Castro’s invasion launching from Yucatan. Fidel Castro and his group of revolutionary leaders launched their small 
invasion force from a port in Veracruz, on the Gulf of Mexico. 
59 Frank Coffin, Witness for Aid (New York: Houghton Mifflin Press, 1964), 256. The quote in the title of this 
subsection “an area seething with subversion” is also drawn from this page of Coffin’s book. 
60 November 5, 1965 - Reftel to Jim Boren from Ted Tenorio – National Archives UD-1174 Box 124, Folder 
“Mexico 65.” 
61 Amembassy Mexico, US Government. “Airgram A-445 from Amembassy Mexico to the Department of State 
August 19, 1969” National Security Database, George Washington University, 13-14. 
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Yucatán Peninsula would shape the perspective of the Iowa Partners in their development 
projects. As a consequence of their shared interest in development and modernization, the Iowa-
Yucatán Partners focused on the goals of Yucatán’s economic and political leaders over the 
interests of the rural Yucatecan populace. Iowan and Yucatecan members in the Partners would 
continue to negotiate the best way to accomplish their development and diplomatic goals as their 
Partnership officially began.  
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CHAPTER 5. IOWA’S MODERNIZING MISSION: ESTABLISHING A PARTNERSHIP 
The Midwestern agricultural state of Iowa seemed to USAID administrators like a perfect 
political and technical fit for a partnership with the Yucatán Peninsula. Elected in the Democratic 
Party sweep of 1964, Iowa Governor Harold Hughes saw Iowa’s agricultural prosperity as 
integral to President Johnson’s international outreach platform. Hughes gave the keynote speech 
at a statewide conference on the Food for Peace program in October 1964, proclaiming that 
“using our surplus food to help feed the undernourished and underprivileged people of other 
nations is something that has a natural appeal to [Iowans].”62 To further promote Iowa as a 
source for technical expertise and diplomacy, Governor Hughes invited the formation of an Iowa 
Partners of the Alliance chapter in October of 1965.  
Iowa and Yucatán seem to have been matched by the State Department and Governor 
Hughes on the basis of their shared interest in agricultural production and community 
development.63 In October of 1965, Governor Hughes announced that after a “request of the 
State Department,” he would invite Iowans to form a Partners chapter to be paired with 
Yucatán.64 In their public declarations, the Iowa Partners and Governor Hughes emphasized a 
“strong historical and geographical link” between Mexico and the United States, and between the 
interests of the two states.65 Governor Hughes also used the partnership with Yucatán to promote 
Iowa as the source of America’s international agricultural expertise. As Hughes proclaimed a 
few months into the Iowa-Yucatán program, “Iowa has long been recognized as a center of 
                                                 
62 Kristin Ahlberg, Transplanting the Great Society: Lyndon Johnson and Food for Peace (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 2008), 48. 
63 USAID Report “Partners of the Alliance,” June 30, 1966 from Tyson Fain - National Archives UD-WW-44 Box 
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64 Iowa Partners News Release, “Comments by Governor Harold Hughes on Trade Development Conference,” 
March 27, 1967 - ISU MS 034 Box 5 Folder 3. 
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learning, research, and special emphasis in this field of agriculture” and its relationship with 
Yucatán allowed for the transfer of knowledge and information.66 
From its formation, Iowa-Yucatán Partners viewed personal travel as a consistently 
effective method for engaging more civilian-experts in development activities. The first project 
for both the Iowa and Yucatán Partners consisted of planned tours of the Yucatán’s proposed 
project sites by a group of volunteers led by Lt. Governor Robert Fulton in late 1965.67 Among 
the volunteers was Monsignor Edward O’Rourke, who returned to Iowa with eleven project 
proposals, ranging from building low-income family housing to acquiring lab equipment for 
Yucatán’s engineering college.68 A group of Iowan agricultural experts and doctors followed 
O’Rourke’s lead one year later, traveling to Yucatán to assess conditions on the ground. These 
early visits to Yucatán informed the priorities and interests of the Iowa-Yucatán Partners 
committees in the following years. 
The national Partners’ administrative office endorsed development projects in the fields 
of agriculture, economic diversification, cultural education, and medical outreach. The earliest 
civilian participants in the Iowa Partners reflected this interest in American development 
expertise. Within the first year of its incorporation, the Iowa Partners membership included a 
Catholic missionary, economics and agronomy professors, nurses and doctors, bank presidents, 
local business owners, and agricultural specialists. Information on the Yucatán Partners is more 
limited, but the Partners program was supported by Governor Luis Torres Mesías and included 
prominent figures such as agribusiness executives, judges, priests, agricultural union leaders, 
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professors, the secretary general of Yucatán, and the State Director of Planning.69 The leaders of 
the two Partners groups met in January 1966, in Mexico City and Mérida, Yucatán. The 
American Partners were briefed in Mexico City by U.S. Ambassador Fulton Freeman on political 
and economic issues in Yucatán, and later met with Yucatán’s Governor Torres Mesías and the 
U.S. Consul’s office to discuss possibilities for development. Torres Mesías and his State 
Director of Planning, Manuel Mier y Teran, were invested in the agricultural modernization and 
the integration of Yucatán into Mexico’s economy, which motivated them to support a closer 
relationship with USAID through the Partners of the Alliance. 
From the inception of the program, American members of the Iowa-Yucatán Partners 
often viewed Mexican members of the program as recipients of charity, rather than equal 
partners in an exchange. After his visit to Yucatán, Monsignor Edward O’Rourke published an 
editorial in the Catholic Rural Life newsletter on life in Yucatán that revealed a mix of concern 
and paternalistic condescension: 
Life is hard for the people of Yucatán. Their land is very rocky and thin. Most 
of their agriculture is primitive. They have little industrial development. 
Almost all their drinking water is contaminated. Dysentery, anemia, 
tuberculosis and various tropic diseases abound….But the people of Yucatán 
are diligent and gentle. Most of them are of the Mayan Indian stock…They 
are quick to love anyone who shows interest in them.70 
This patronizing belief that Yucatán’s populace would receive American missionaries and 
experts with open arms suggests that Iowa members truly expected that their help was needed 
and desired. Despite this rosy paternalistic view, the Iowan Partners faced many barriers, both 
practical and ideological, to their modernizing mission.  
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CHAPTER 6. “UNOFFICIAL PEOPLE” ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS: THE 
CONTRADICTIONS OF CIVILIAN DIPLOMACY 
 The activities of the Iowa-Yucatán Partners of the Alliance revealed the tensions between 
the Iowans’ paternalistic attitudes toward Yucatecans and their desire to uphold the “mutual self-
help” mission of the Partners of the Alliance. The Iowan Partners were confronted by the 
contradictions inherent in the Partners model and struggled to reconcile ideological support for 
self-sufficiency clashing with their pragmatic desire to lead development in directions that 
benefited American political and economic interests. The strategies and communication about 
these projects also give some insight into Yucatecan leaders’ attitudes towards their state’s 
modernization, as well as the role of the United States and their own rural population in that 
process. The projects of the Partners therefore reveal the complexities of negotiating control over 
technology and aid in a transnational development network. 
Both Yucatán and Iowa Partners were invested in improving Yucatán’s regional economy 
through modernization and technological advancement. By 1965, Yucatán’s economy and 
environment had served American demand for henequen for over 80 years, but the collapse of 
that market had led to severe economic decline in the region. Manuel Mier y Teran, Director of 
Planning for Yucatán and key member of the Yucatán Partners, had organized a pro-
industrialization round table conference in 1966 to discuss strategies to bolster the state’s 
economy. Yucatán, with the help of USAID funding, planned to drill around 80 wells between 
1966 and 1967 for the purpose of growing oranges and vegetables for the American winter 
produce market. While these crops required more extensive irrigation than henequen, they were 
also more profitable. Other key agricultural industries included dairy cattle, pork and egg 
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production, which could reduce Yucatán’s reliance on foodstuffs from the rest of Mexico.71 
These projects were often planned by the Mexican government and funded through Mexico’s 
federal Agrarian Bank.72  
Manuel Mier y Teran’s industrializing and diversifying approach to agriculture received 
enthusiastic support from his counterparts in Iowa, leading to a number of immediate projects to 
share agricultural knowledge. In June of 1966, the Iowa Partners committee formed a team of 
Iowan and Yucatecan experts to examine henequen-growing practices and find alternative uses 
for the region’s major crop. The team visited henequen-growing estates and experimented with 
using a pulpy byproduct of henequen, called bagasse, as roughage for cattle feed and as fiber for 
roofing and carpeting.73 In the same few months, the Iowa Partners chapter invited several 
representatives from the Yucatán Partners to visit the farms of Roswell Garst to study “modern” 
cattle-feeding methods. 74 Garst, an Iowa hybrid-seed corn farmer famed for visiting the Soviet 
Union and hosting Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev on a goodwill agricultural exchange trip, 
was happy to promote the image of American agricultural superiority and generosity to Mexican 
farmers as well.75  
While the Partners attempted to modernize Yucatán’s agriculture according to the model 
of Midwestern American farms, they began to develop transnational networks of knowledge and 
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exchange. The Iowan Partners held unexamined, paternalistic assumptions about the perceived 
deficiencies and backwardness of the people in Latin America, a problem inherent to their drive 
to reform and remake subaltern spaces. In August 1967, the Iowa-Yucatán Partners attempted to 
coordinate with the U.S. Consul William Harben, Yucatecan agronomist Otto Peniche, and 
Mayor Francisco Medina Nuñes in their efforts to irrigate agricultural land around the city of 
Valladolid, which was historically home to a large Maya population. Consul Harben informed 
the Partners that Peniche had discouraged the Partners from funding a complex fixed-irrigation 
system and large land plots because, in Harben’s words, “though [the new irrigation system is] 
efficient and modern, is unlikely to spread because the Indians are not ready for it.” Peniche 
suggested a system in which artificial cisterns would be placed in the center of several small 
plots of land distributed to peasants, which could be irrigated by hand-drawn bucket. Echoing the 
paternalistic views of Yucatecan elites toward Mayan workers, Consul Harben called the plan 
“more primitive and less efficient, but therefore more adaptable to the peasant mentality.” 
Despite the Partners’ extensive consultation over this project, including correspondence with 
leaders from the U.S. State Department’s Water for Peace program and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s research services, there seems to have been no direct correspondence or 
consultation with the peasants themselves about which methods were most suited to their 
technical and personal needs.76 The primary concern for the Iowa-Yucatán Partners seems to 
have been the perceived backwardness of rural Yucatecans and their willingness to provide labor 
for these “self-help” projects than their preferences or attitudes towards modernizing.77 
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Young Iowans and Yucatecans played a central role in the Partners connection between 
travel for pleasure, diplomacy and knowledge exchange, which were central to the U.S. informal 
empire. Like the Peace Corps, the Partners of the Alliance saw young people as a valuable 
resource for transmitting goodwill and technical information between the United States and Latin 
America. However, the U.S. Consul warned the Iowa-Yucatán Partners against “anything 
resembling a Peace Corps operation” because it would require diplomatic approval and Mexican 
officials had already declined to allow Peace Corps activity in their country.78 A simple student 
exchange, by contrast, would not be subjected to the same level of resistance or scrutiny. As this 
communication suggests, the Partners viewed young people as an important and politically 
sensitive population for diplomatic outreach, especially in a vulnerable region like Yucatán. 
During a 1967 meeting of the Iowan Partners committee, Yucatecan priest Father Alvaro García 
described the ongoing economic crisis in the state and then warned, in the words of an Iowa 
Partners memo, “about the increased activity on the part of the Cuban Consulate [in Mérida]. He 
said that many and varied programs are being offered by the Cubans to appeal to young people.” 
He encouraged the Iowa-Yucatán Partners to focus their efforts on intervening among poor and 
disenfranchised Yucatecan youth in order to prevent them from developing communist 
sympathies with the nearby Cubans. García suggested that educational exchanges and 
transnational vocational training for young people could improve the diplomatic effectiveness of 
the Partners’ organization.79  
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The Partners’ success in youth programming translated into one of its largest and most 
active programs: its student exchanges. The students’ travel experiences were transmuted into a 
form of development expertise, as they were meant to absorb the other region’s cultural and 
technical activities and become advocates for exchange.  In 1966, Iowan geology professor Dr. 
Harriet Heusinkveld spearheaded a scholarship program to bring students from the Yucatán to 
Iowa and send Iowan students to Yucatán to study its famed archaeological sites.80 The exchange 
program also included opportunities for art and language teachers in Yucatán to visit Iowa and 
teach high school and university students about Yucatecan culture.81 The exchange program was 
intended to teach language skills, expose young people to one another’s cultures, and most 
notably, let young people “observe first-hand the vocation of their choice in a foreign setting.” 
Young men were brought to Iowa farms to give them the “opportunity to compare methods of 
farm production with those of their own farms in Yucatán.”82 The student exchange program 
received positive reception from the U.S. Department of State and was publicly honored by 
USAID administrator James Boren in a 1966 recognition ceremony.83 During their presentation 
to the public, the Iowa-Yucatán Partners stressed that it was important to use young people to 
build a closer relationship between the two states, especially given that Yucatán, in Jeanette 
Westfall’s words, was “located only a little more than 100 miles from Communist-controlled 
Cuba.”84  
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While these programs met with relative success, internal debates and friction within the 
Iowa Partners reveal the complexities of both “mutual self-help” diplomacy and the public-
private status of civilian diplomats. The Iowa and Yucatán Partners committees often worked in 
isolation, without communicating about one another’s plans. The two committees finally sat 
down for a meeting in 1967 at the American Consul in Mérida to hash out some logistical issues. 
The Yucatán Partners asserted that Iowa’s Governor Harold Hughes treated their partnership as a 
“governor-to-governor program” by planning exchanges without Yucatecan civilian input, and 
argued for a more equitable management of the exchanges. A young boy from Iowa had been 
delivered to a Yucatán Partners member’s home without prior notice due to miscommunication 
by the Iowa Partners. In response to this error, Iowan Partner David Rieger stated that he 
“[didn’t] see how the Yucatán Partners Committee [could] be held responsible for mishaps to 
unofficial people.” In response, Yucatán Partners Chairman Rios-Covián stated that regardless of 
an Iowans official or unofficial status, “the press would hold [the Yucatán Partners] responsible 
if there were any link whatever to the program.” Expanding on the importance of communication 
for effective program management, Manuel Mier y Teran put forward the idea that the Yucatán 
committee should be informed whenever any Iowan tourists came to Yucatán, so that the 
Partners could help the tourist network “with residents in his special field.” 85 Both the Iowa and 
Yucatán Partners clearly wrestled with the ambiguities of civilian diplomacy and what 
constituted the “official or unofficial” status of their student exchanges and tourists. 
When they were faced with balancing the roles of national representative and goodwill 
ambassador, the students involved in the Partners exchanges experienced significant scrutiny and 
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cultural clashes. Several Iowan students expressed disappointment that they would not have the 
opportunity to work during their stay in Yucatán, as the exchange had been promoted as work 
training, and the Yucatecan students were apparently unaccustomed to doing labor on American-
style farms, if they had worked at all. In fact, the program was criticized in Yucatán’s local press 
for selecting students from “prosperous backgrounds or the social elite” to visit the United 
States.86 During their 1967 meeting in Mérida, the Iowa-Yucatán Partners agreed that the 
program needed to be more effectively integrated between the two Partners committees and 
student placements chosen according to complementary economic and personal interests.87 After 
this meeting, previous exchange students Michele Conway in Iowa and Nidia Baquiero in 
Yucatán spearheaded the formation of Junior Partners committees to advise in selecting future 
exchangees and to provide them with advice on fitting in with their host families, appropriate 
behavior in their host-state’s culture and interaction with their peers. For example, one Junior 
Partners letter to future exchange students warned Iowa students about Yucatán’s conservative 
culture and that students should be careful about drinking and dating, because it might cause 
offense to their host families.88 The students needed to be careful about their conduct, as their 
daily behavior represented constant American diplomatic presence in Yucatán. The symbolic 
political value of the student exchange forced Iowan and Yucatecan youths into the difficult 
position of acting as students and diplomats at once. 
In addition to cultural friction, the Partners’ border-crossing project was also beset with 
logistical and political concerns about moving development supplies from the United States to 
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Mexico. In 1966, within the first months of the partnership, the Iowa Partners decided it was not 
feasible to purchase equipment and send across the border into Mexico for some of their 
development projects. The Mexican government viewed imported equipment as a deterrent to the 
nation’s industrial growth and the import duties were therefore prohibitively expensive. For 
example, one of the first projects developed by the Iowa committee focused on purchasing 
agricultural fertilizer sprayers for a farming cooperative in Sotuta, Yucatán, but it was 
determined that the cost of shipping made the project untenable. Instead, the Partners decided to 
donate funding for the purchase of the sprayers to the Sotuta farm.89 From their earliest projects, 
the Iowa-Yucatán Partners discovered that imposing their vision of agricultural modernity on the 
Mexican hinterlands came with a number of logistical obstacles. Monsignor O’Rourke believed 
the Iowa-Yucatán Partners needed to “seek more substantial assistance from the National 
Partners committee [and] State Department…in regard to import permits and similar matters 
which are outside our competence.”90 In 1967, one Iowa Partner even requested that the US 
Embassy make arrangements for Partners project materials to be shipped duty-free, but the 
Embassy and USAID denied the request on the principle that this would discourage the Partners 
from focusing on their private resources and network.91 
The early years of the Iowa-Yucatán Partnership were fraught with various challenges. 
Despite the support of Iowan civic leaders for the organization, the Iowa Partners president Bill 
Brown struggled to acquire funding for projects that required coordination across national 
borders between two groups of volunteers. Brown and his fellow Iowa Partners found these 
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transnational projects especially difficult to maintain because the Yucatán Partners organization 
seemed to lack consistent leadership and was forced to disband and re-form several times.92 As a 
result of this inconsistent Yucatecan activity, the Iowa Partners found it “distressing to note the 
social disorganization which prevails in Yucatán,” but felt they needed to “avoid the posture of 
dictating to [the Yucatecans].”93USAID administrator Ted Tenorio reported to Boren in 1967 
that Yucatán Partners Chairman Ríos-Covián was “somewhat annoyed” that the Iowa Partners 
had been organizing work training and student exchanges without consulting their counterparts; 
he also noted that the Iowa Partners had violated Mexican federal policy about the importation of 
used clothing.94 The Iowa Partners seemed to find it difficult to strike a balance between their 
impulse to impose their preferred forms of assistance and the principle of “mutual self-help” that 
governed the Partnership system.  
This internal conflict about the purpose of the Partners is best illustrated through the 
attitudes of the Iowa Partners committee on how to approach the issues of disinterest and uneven 
exchange. While Iowan and Yucatán chapters were able to coordinate on issues affecting 
Yucatán, few projects were ever undertaken to stimulate “self-help” in Iowa. At a 1968 board 
meeting, the Iowa committee directors identified a lack of Yucatecan investment and 
participation as the organization’s primary concern. The Iowa committee admitted that they had 
not expressed any real interest in help that the Yucatán committee could provide to Iowa. 
However, the Iowa Partners diverted away from this issue and asserted that the major obstacle to 
getting Yucatecans invested in the program was the Mexican government’s obstruction. In their 
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view, Mexico discouraged its citizens from participating in transnational partnerships so that the 
Mexican government could bolster its political legitimacy as the sole provider of social welfare 
and modernizing technologies in Mexico.95 The Iowa Partners committee concluded that “[Iowa 
Partners are] confronted with two obstacles….the intense national pride of the Mexican citizens; 
and, the disinclination of the Yucatan state government to be interested in foreign intervention 
where the government itself desires and needs the credit for doing good works.”96 Of course, the 
Iowa Partners did not consider the long history of U.S. intervention in twentieth-century Mexico, 
which might validate the Mexican government’s desire to regulate American influences in 
Yucatán.97 The Iowa Partners committee asserted that any political differences between the two 
nations should be a secondary concern to the threat of “communist propaganda and the 
persuasion of revolutionary leaders” they saw endangering the Western Hemisphere. The Iowa 
Partners did not consider that stimulating further Partners activity or “self-help” in Iowa might 
increase Yucatecan interest and overcome Mexican resistance to the program. These discussions 
make it clear that the in the eyes of the Iowa Partners, the program focused on development in 
Yucatán and preventing communist activity in Mexico, much more than pursuing mutual aid or 
friendship.  
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CHAPTER 7. “CHAC-MOOL WANTS YOU!”: RECRUITING THE TOURIST-TECHNICIAN 
In order to accomplish their development goals in the face of logistical and political 
challenges, Iowa-Yucatán Partners relied upon the draw of the Yucatán Peninsula’s unique and 
historic environmental attractions to build up its civilian development resources and ability to 
transport goods. From the inception of the Partners program, federal administrators planned to 
incrementally reduce funding and management support for the state-level chapters until the 
program was entirely based on private civilian activity. To this end, the Partners shifted from 
James Boren’s leadership to the National Association of the Partners of the Alliance (NAPA) in 
1967.98 NAPA and its state level Partners organizations became more focused on public outreach 
and engagement as it became a private non-profit voluntary agency.99 Over the next several 
years, the Iowa-Yucatán Partners used the appeal of the Yucatán to develop a network of experts 
and missionaries that allowed it to expand its programs despite shrinking public funds.   
Iowan Partners used images and ideas about the exotic and remote nature of Yucatán to 
spur interest and to encourage American civilians to participate in the Partners’ cultural and 
technical exchange. In order to drum up support for the Iowa-Yucatán Junior Partners’ student 
exchange program, high school and college students in Iowa sent out flyers emblazoned with the 
image of a chacmool, a famous style of pre-Columbian statue found in Chichen Itza, Yucatán, 
and widely-considered a “masterpiece” of indigenous Mexican art.100 To this ancient icon, the 
American students added their own cultural symbols of youth and civic service. The statue was 
drawn wearing high-top sneakers, with his arm extended and finger pointed at the reader, 
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declaring “Chac-Mool Wants You!” in a clear allusion to the iconic imagery of Uncle Sam 
recruiting for the U.S. Army. The flyer stated that “Chac – the part-time Mayan rain god and our 
full-time recruiter” wanted to “chac-up a few new members,” and invited potential host families 
and exchange participants to attend one of the Junior Partners events to learn about “all things 
Yucatecan.”101 This document reveals a fascinating, if facetious, intermixing of “exotic” 
indigenous religion and art, youthful enthusiasm, and symbolic appeals to American militarism 
and civic duty. This type of promotional strategy became an important part of the Iowa-Yucatán 
Partners’ development efforts, drawing the interest of experts and donors toward the Partners’ 
projects through touristic cultural appeal blended with a sense of global citizenship.  
 In order to send the message to experts that Yucatán was a desirable place to do 
humanitarian work, the promotional material for the Iowa-Yucatán program often paired the 
perceived deficiencies and backwardness of Latin America with descriptions of the cultural and 
environmental appeal that Yucatán offered to visitors. Iowa Partners announced in one of their 
publications that “Latin America, while unbelievably poor by our economic standards here, has a 
wealth of other things to offer us: art and archaeology, cultural background, fascinating history, 
tourist and vacation spots, warm and lasting friendship, and good-will.”102 Opportunities for 
sight-seeing and cultural education in Yucatán were used by the Partners to lure development 
experts and American civilians into participating in the Partners’ projects. Study of the Iowa-
Yucatán Partners therefore demonstrates an often-overlooked link between development 
expertise and touristic consumption. While historians have researched and written on large-scale 
development efforts to promote a tourism-based economy in the Yucatán Peninsula, this research 
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often views tourists simply as consumers who benefit from this model of foreign-market-oriented 
modernization.103 The Iowa-Yucatán Partners illustrate that tourists could be not just observers 
or beneficiaries of development but active participants in the remaking of foreign spaces, 
imposing American ideas about correct and modern ways of living on remote developing 
regions. These tourists’ self-formed identities as consumers of exotic environments and 
reformers of deficient landscapes were inseparable, making them ‘tourist-technicians.’ 
Yucatán’s leaders also saw great economic possibility in the region’s history and 
environment. Several historians have noted an interesting relationship between Yucatán’s 
success as a tourist site, its remoteness and unique culture, and its integration into an informal 
imperial economy.104 State political leaders within Yucatán recognized and wished to capitalize 
on the exotic appeal and touristic potential of Yucatán for both Mexican and American tourists. 
As Director of Planning Manuel Mier y Teran noted, the region’s picturesque beaches and rich 
archaeological sites made it perfect for attracting visitors, but the lack of personal transportation 
infrastructure had kept tourist numbers down to only 130,000 people annually. The Yucatecan 
planners believed that constructing modern amenities and building roads to improve accessibility 
to major Mayan archaeological sites would improve the state’s income. One such project was 
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already in progress by 1966 for “modernizing and adapting The Gran Cenote Zaci of Valladolid” 
with the construction of restaurants, parks, and an outdoor theatre around the ancient Mayan 
cultural site.105 Building from this desire to capitalize on ancient cultural values and 
environmental conditions, the Partners activities often intensified this push towards both 
antiquarian and modernizing impulses. 
Jeanette Westfall, committee secretary of the Iowa Partners chapter, spearheaded efforts 
to link touristic appeal with development within the Iowa-Yucatán Partners. In mid-1967, the 
Iowa Partners sent Westfall to Yucatán to check ongoing projects and to generate positive news 
stories for the Des Moines Tribune about the Iowa Partners’ work. In her first article for the 
Tribune, she paints an appealing and exotic picture of the Peninsula: 
As the shimmering jet Azteca de Oro (Golden Aztec) touched down in 
Mérida, Yucatán, we were greeted on every side by flaming tropical color 
– jacaranda, bougainvillea, flamboyant, and a multitude of other exotic 
flowers and trees. Jungle birds screeched a welcome, and overhead the 
zopilotes…circled by the hundreds. Windmills, instead of television 
antennas, towered above every house and it was truly like stepping into 
another world.106 
 
Westfall’s description, which emphasizes both the beauty and perceived backwardness of 
Mérida, encapsulates the Partners’ efforts to draw in “tourist-technicians” and other voluntary 
organizations for their development endeavors. Westfall was an extremely active community 
member and political organizer, conversant in Spanish with family in both Mexico and the 
United States and a keen interest in travel. With this combination of qualities and interests, 
Jeanette Westfall was a consummate transnational networker. Called “Iowa’s First Compañero 
                                                 
105 “La Industrialización en El Estado de Yucatán,” El Mercado de Valores 2 (January 1967) - National Archives, 
UD-WW-44, Box 19, Iowa-Yucatán Briefing Materials, 1967-1968. 
106 Jeanette Westfall, Draft of Des Moines Tribune (article 1 of 10) n.d. - National Archives UD-WW-44 Container 
19 Folder Iowa/Yucatán Briefing Material 1966-67. 
42 
 
 
[sic]” by the Partners committee, Westfall wrote over a dozen letters each day to Iowa and 
Yucatán Partners as well as other private voluntary agencies who might be able to support the 
Partners’ activities.107 As a result of her tireless networking and leadership within the Iowa-
Yucatán Partners organization, Westfall was elected to the Executive Committee of NAPA in 
1970 and served as a representative on the Board of Directors of the Inter-American Partners of 
the Americas, positions which allowed her to promote tourism as a tool for effective 
transnational development.108 
The Iowan Partners stumbled upon tourism as a solution to the challenge of traversing the 
Yucatán Peninsula to provide aid in small and isolated villages. For example, one of the greatest 
challenges of the Partners’ development project consisted of providing medical care and moving 
expensive medical supplies to furnish field clinics across the Peninsula. Jeanette Westfall and her 
husband Dr. R. William Westfall led the initiative to create the first medical-dental teams which 
had traveled across the Yucatán Peninsula and attended to thousands of patients in small rural 
field clinics and missionary sites. Medical staff volunteering for the Partners often needed to hire 
“bush pilots” to fly them into remote and unreachable villages to provide medical care and stock 
clinics with medical supplies.109 In order to overcome increasingly strict travel and transport 
requirements from the national Partners organization, the Westfalls created a “Partners Travel 
Program” by recruiting friends and acquaintances to visit as tourists and reserve luggage space 
for medical supplies and medicine for the Yucatecan clinics.110 After the success of these initial 
trips in the late 1960s, the Iowa-Yucatán Partners began to view tourism as a useful tool for 
development and began to lead multiple annual tours across Mexico to the Peninsula starting in 
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1970.111 Westfall guided her tour groups to the famous archaeological sites of Chichen Itza and 
Dzibilchaltun, the beaches of Progreso and Isla Mujeres, and the project sites of the Iowa-
Yucatán Partners. Iowa Partners circulars promoted the tours as a way “to visit Partners project 
areas and to help transport goods” needed to keep the projects going.112 The Partners advertised 
and exploited Yucatán’s unique history and environment to enact its modernizing designs. This 
approach shaped Iowa Partners’ network of supporters to view Yucatecan environment as 
consumable and changeable by American experts and tourists. This tourist-technician strategy 
helped to form what historian Ricardo Salvatore has referred to as “the enterprise of knowledge” 
the United States developed to understand and control Latin American countries and spaces.113 
As the federal administrators of the Partners program gradually reduced the program’s 
resources, the Partners became increasingly reliant upon their civilian status and tourism to 
accomplish their development goals. A constant source of delay was the cost and logistical 
challenge of moving donated equipment and materials across the border into Yucatán. As the 
Iowa Partners announced in their newsletter, “costs…particularly for transportation of our 
shipments is killing us.”114 These financial pressures allowed unorthodox methods like the 1969 
Airstream Caravan trips to emerge. Using private networking and their civilian status, the 
Partners could bypass the financial and political obstructions they would face by importing 
goods in their official capacity as an international aid program. The Partners moved medical and 
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agricultural supplies through similar methods. For example, the National Association publicized 
a private cargo-moving strategy adopted by the Iowa-Yucatán Partners: “one Iowa family has 
made 36 trips to Yucatán, 15 by car, transporting medical supplies and pharmaceuticals.”115 The 
Partners celebrated this activity as a way to transform development into a process that blended 
diplomacy and adventure for an average Iowa family. At the same time, this strategy fulfilled the 
Partners of the Alliance’s directive to draw upon the resources and abilities of civilians to 
streamline development in Latin America. 
The use of civilian status was also a means to subvert what the Iowan Partners viewed as 
an obstructive and inefficient Mexican bureaucracy surrounding imports. Iowa Partner Jeanette 
Westfall did much of the networking with civilians and voluntary organizations, communicating 
key information about how to transport development supplies. In one letter to a Missouri doctor 
who planned to come along on a Partners medical mission trip, Westfall noted that the Partners 
“have had no trouble bringing in medicines for these programs but have done it on an 
‘unofficial,’ personal basis, lying a little when necessary to emphasize that they are for personal 
use.” Westfall gave the doctor advice on how to evade scrutiny and onerous paperwork, saying 
“I think your best bet is to operate as a ‘private citizen’ and nothing should be said about 
connections with a government program or other organized groups, which could then become 
more complicated.”116 It seems that the Iowa-Yucatán Partners often viewed ‘civilian’ or 
‘tourist’ as the most useful identities, where the roles of ‘diplomat’ and ‘expert’ could become 
strategic liabilities in the face of Mexican political resistance or bureaucratic inertia. 
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At times, it was not only import costs but concerns about corruption and graft that 
encouraged the Partners to transport aid supplies privately. During a medical service trip, Nurse 
Eileen Kruse packed “as many medicine samples and disposable syringes and needles as possible 
in her personal luggage” to avoid confiscation by the Mexican authorities. The customs officials 
sent the rest of their medical supplies to a warehouse in Mérida, where the Partners had to offer a 
small bribe of money “plus vitamins for all the officials’ families” to get their equipment back.117 
The Iowa Partners also transported their fertilized chicken eggs as personal luggage on airplanes. 
Though the Partners did not fear confiscation, they reported that their eggs and luggage had to be 
inspected by customs to ensure that they did not contain concealed weapons that could be used 
for hijacking the plane, given the proximity of the Yucatán coast to Cuba.118 Through this 
improvised method, the Partners’ poultry project had distributed over 7,500 fertilized American 
chicken eggs by 1971, largely through private travelers across the Peninsula.119 At the end of the 
same year, the Iowa Partners circulated a report of the year’s projects and announced that “eight 
tours groups went to Yucatán during the year, to visit Partners project areas and to help transport 
goods, as well as to enjoy the incredible tourist attractions of our Partner state.”120 These 
methods of combining tourist travel and transnational shipping, while effective in overcoming 
transport obstacles, also illustrate the Iowa-Yucatán Partners’ distrust of the Mexican 
government and their desire to bypass government oversight of their activities. 
As the technician-tourist approach continued and grew in the early 1970s, the Iowa 
Partners continued to argue that regular exchange of tourists and experts was key to reshaping 
local conditions in Yucatán. As one newsletter noted, “in many instances, [providing aid] is a 
                                                 
117 “Eileen Kruse Takes Part in Iowa-Yucatán Partners of the Americas” Ackley World Journal, November 4, 1971. 
118 “Poultry Improvement Projects for Iowa’s Sister State, Yucatán,” Moravia Union, February 11, 1971. 
119 Partners of the Americas, “Christmas Tour Itinerary,” 1971 – ISU MS 034 Box 5 Folder 3. 
120 Boone Regional Partners of the Americas, “Bulletin #7” June 1971 – ISU MS 034 Box 5 Folder 4. 
46 
 
 
losing battle. Clear up the tropical parasites and within a month they are re-infested. Start a baby 
on vitamins and food-supplement formula and a month later the supply is exhausted.” They 
promoted increasing the number of regular trips and shipments of supplies from the United 
States to Mexico, but most notably, stressed more training for Mexican personnel to carry on 
their projects.121 In order for their Partnership to have a lasting impact, the Iowa Partners argued, 
the organization should aim to reshape Mexican experts and locals in the image of American 
technicians. For example, the agricultural experiment stations saw closer interaction of Iowa and 
Yucatán Partners with international NGOs. The International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Center, founded by Rockefeller Foundation’s experiments with Mexican wheat production in the 
1940s, donated four varieties of corn for experimentation across Yucatán under the direction of 
Iowa Partner Walt Goeppinger. The varieties were spread across the Peninsula to be planted and 
tended by campesinos, or peasant farmers, under the direction of American agriculturalists and 
the Yucatán Partners leadership.122 Through these small-scale projects, Iowans worked to train 
Mexican participants to carry out agricultural experiments for modernizing the region’s 
agriculture. The trips that Iowan technicians made to Mexico served the purpose of transporting 
development goods and expertise, but also served as training missions to establish a local source 
of American-style technical expertise in the Yucatecan population. 
While the Partners provide an excellent case study of how civilian diplomacy used their 
private status to reshape foreign spaces and politics, this type of civic expertise exchange and 
missionary work became an increasingly prominent diplomatic model over the 1960s and 1970s. 
Much of the United States’  “people-to-people diplomacy,” development outreach, and travel 
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during this period provoked criticism of an American imperialist mindset.123 One direct and 
famous critique of civilian volunteers and travelers came from Catholic reformist Monsignor 
Ivan Illich. His famous 1968 address at the Conference on Inter-American Student Projects in 
Cuernavaca, Mexico, to American volunteers asserted that student “mission vacations” were 
“benevolent invasions.”124 These missions reflected American citizens’ belief that they possessed 
kind of innate expertise on the virtues of modern living. Illich criticized the missionaries’ 
assumption that they could “help Mexican peasants ‘develop’ by spending a summer with them.” 
Speaking directly to a group of American student-volunteers, he argued that “by definition, you 
cannot help being vacationing salesmen for the middle class ‘American Way of Life.’” Illich 
believed that American civic outreach and tourism were bound to disseminate political values, 
economic strategies, and technical expertise to Latin American communities in ways that 
primarily benefited the American volunteers and the United States.125 While Illich addressed his 
speech to an audience of young Catholic missionaries, it was often civic organizations like the 
Partners of the Alliance that recruited and led these “vacationing salesmen” into transnational 
travel and development activity. 
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CHAPTER 8. FLYING DOCTORS AND EGG-LIFT MISSIONS: DEVELOPMENT 
THROUGH BORDER-CROSSING 
The tourist-technician represented a central part of the Partners’ development strategy 
and reflected the power the Partners saw in civilian mobility and networking as methods for 
developing Yucatán. Across the late 1960s and early 1970s, networking with other volunteer, 
non-profit, and missionary organizations provided the Iowa-Yucatán Partners of the Alliance 
with more resources and broader civilian engagement in their medical, educational and 
agricultural projects. For example, Monsignor Edward O’Rourke spearheaded much of the 
Partners’ activity, in part because it complemented his work as president of the National Catholic 
Rural Life Conference, a missionary organization which promoted politically conservative but 
technologically-modern agricultural policies. The NCRLC often had a paternalistic bent in its 
outreach to other nations; the organization’s preceding president had argued that colonialism by 
Western developed nations had benefits to the colonized and believed that “some strong ties with 
a real ‘mother country are necessary” for a ‘developing’ country to achieve stable self-rule.126 
Though his views were not so overtly paternalistic, O’Rourke promoted international outreach 
for both his missionary and civilian work and continued to stress the importance of introducing 
advanced agricultural technologies.127 For example, in 1972, he headed a project to transport 
$15,000 worth of donated dairy-pasteurization equipment from a farm in Iowa to Mérida, 
Yucatán. O’Rourke coordinated the equipment’s transport with Yucatán Partners member Lina 
Esquivel and the wife of Yucatán’s governor, who wanted to install the equipment at the state’s 
Institute for the Protection of Children. The Iowa-Yucatán Partners promoted the project as one 
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of their greatest successes, as it provided pasteurized milk to an estimated 11,000 children in 
Yucatán.128 
The Partners networked with several religious missionary organizations for logistical and 
cultural support.  The primary religious missionary presence in the region were Maryknoll 
Catholic priests and Presbyterians. Both missionary organizations had longstanding relationships 
with local communities and the Iowa Partners believed that these missionaries held expertise on 
local conditions that could help the Partners in their development mission. For example, 
Maryknoll parish priests Father Robert E. Lee and Father Peter Petrucci, who were both 
conversant in Yucatec-Maya, had already helped establish an agricultural production cooperative 
and secondary school during the 1960s.129 The Partners therefore solicited project suggestions 
from the Maryknoll priests and the U.S. Consul in Mérida, who recommended that the Partners 
build farm-to-market roads in rural towns and provided practical support in moving equipment 
and supplies.130 The United States Presbyterian missionaries in Yucatán had been active for over 
50 years and were running a youth camp and medical center, Clinica La Esperanza, both of 
which were falling into debt and serious disrepair. Starting in 1968, the Iowa Partners 
coordinated regular medical-dental team trips across Yucatán to help treat patients at these 
remote clinics.131 The Iowa Partners wished to support these missions due to their educational 
and medical focus and tap into existing transnational networks for diplomatic purposes. 
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In order to improve educational development, the Iowa-Yucatán Partners formed 
relationships with educators in both Iowa and Yucatán to provide supplies to existing Yucatecan 
schools and to support vocational and secondary education in urban areas. Under the direction of 
Iowan Partners member and Central College dean James Graham in 1970 and 1971, the Partners 
constructed a satellite campus associated with Central College in Mérida and “sent over 100 
faculty and students” to operate this branch campus.132 The Partners also constructed “social-
educational centers” where Mérida’s youth were instructed in English and trade skills and 
received medical and dental examinations from Yucatecan trainees.133 In accordance with Father 
García’s warning about the threat of Cubans fomenting communist sympathies among vulnerable 
youth, the Partners attempted to reach out to youth in urban areas of Yucatán and provide them 
with leadership and vocational training to advance economic development in the region. 
As a civilian organization, the Partners of the Alliance had the power to network with 
many other international programs and organizations without the scrutiny such programs 
received in Mexico when their research was funded and controlled by the U.S. government. In 
order to improve conditions for rural Yucatecans and demonstrate the goodwill of Iowa’s 
experts, the Iowa-Yucatán Partners focused much of their development effort in modernizing 
livestock and grain agriculture into Yucatán. Iowan experts in soil and crops, livestock and 
poultry, well-digging and pump design, and farm machinery traveled in working groups to 
Mexico to share their expertise with local engineers and agronomists in Yucatán and to advise 
local agriculturalists on ongoing poultry, cattle, and grain-growing experiments.134 The Iowa 
Partners’ agricultural chairman was Walt Goeppinger, who was President of the National Corn 
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Growers’ Association and was nationally-known for his previous agricultural outreach in both 
public and private capacities. He had served as advisor to the Foreign Agricultural Service, and 
in 1960, Goeppinger had personally developed a mission to airlift 36 Iowa hogs to the typhoon-
struck Yamanashi Prefecture in Japan, and thereby create a market for U.S. grain exports.135 In 
Yucatán, Agricultural chair Goeppinger wanted to introduce American-developed high-protein 
corn seed as a way to overcome the Peninsula’s rocky and low-yielding soil conditions. 
Goeppinger corresponded with scientists in the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations already 
working to develop wheat and alfalfa breeds for Yucatán’s soil conditions.136  
 Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, the informality of the Partners’ volunteer 
approach meant they could also be flexible in directing multiple international humanitarian 
organizations and experts into their preferred projects. Much of the activity undertaken by the 
Iowa-Yucatán Partners network were directed into small villages to be completed 
simultaneously. For example, the Partners directed the resources of the Yucatecan government, 
missionaries, local volunteers and donors in Boone, Iowa, and both Partners committees into the 
small village of Yaxachen. Volunteers for the Partners installed a well and pump irrigation 
system, started a seed and poultry project, shipped in 4 tons of food and irrigation pipe, and 
brought in a team of doctors and nurses to establish a local immunization and public health 
program.137 In Xocenpich, another small rural town, the Partners started a poultry production 
project, dug irrigation wells for an agricultural experiment station, constructed a dental clinic and 
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supplemented the “woefully inadequate” local medical clinic.138 This pulled together the support 
of the Mexican and American Presbyterian churches, the women’s private voluntary Altrusa 
Club, the Women’s Guild and Men’s Brotherhood of Pella, professors from Iowa universities, 
the Partners committees, and Promise, Inc., an international clinic-building organization.139 
Promise, Inc. had a particular interest in this site due to its involvement in the Missionary 
Aviation Fund, a program for flying medical and missionary teams into remote locations in 
Yucatán. The Iowa Partners worked closely with Promise, Inc. leadership to resurrect this 
program, precisely because it complemented the Partners’ desire to make their program 
increasingly mobile and less centralized. 
Without regular networking with organizations based in Yucatán and consistent border-
crossing trips, communication between the two Partners committees was limited to a lethargic 
mail delivery system and the restricted use of Telex (networked electro-mechanical printers) 
between Cordemex executives and the Iowa Governor’s office, a dynamic that undermined the 
civilian focus of the Partners program. In fact, in 1967 the National Association of the Partners 
attempted to address this problem by creating a hemispheric amateur radio station network 
operated by civilian Partners to allow for more active and regular communication between 
Partners committees separated by huge distances.140 The system was enthusiastically adopted by 
the Iowa Partners, who hoped that it would help make project management and training easier. 
Several Yucatan Partners even successfully proposed that a radio system could be used to 
transmit recorded teaching materials across remote parts of the Peninsula. Thus, the Iowa 
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Partners worked with Yucatecan Partners and the local school Colegio Peninsular who wanted to 
develop a system of “cultural diffusion by radio broadcast,” similar to methods adopted by the 
Catholic Church and the American government during this same Cold War period.141 While the 
radio network was designed to reduce logistical barriers to transnational cultural interaction and 
communication about development, even the creation and maintenance of this network relied 
upon the relative ease of movement of technicians and equipment across the United States border 
with Mexico to purchase and install radio station equipment. 
Though the American Partners considered free movement of supplies and experts 
between the United States and Latin America to be an effective development strategy, some 
critics of the program stressed that it created opportunities for corruption and excessive spending. 
In 1968, USAID and the National Association of the Partners of the Alliance reduced their 
annual travel funding by more than fifty percent as a result of federal budget cuts.142 The 
following year, Delaware Senator John J. Williams publicly scolded the National Association’s 
administrators for its misuse of travel and discretionary funding from a USAID grant.143 NAPA 
began to impose much stricter policies regarding travel funding for its “volunteer technicians.” 
While the National Association still promoted the idea of using travel as “a magnet, a catalyst to 
involve new people” in the program, it began to encourage technicians to pay their own way as a 
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way to avoid excessive bureaucratic burdens.144 Every travel funding request required the 
completion of a lengthy application subject to committee approvals and a reimbursement system 
which required detailed reports on each trip.145 While some Iowa-Yucatan Partners did complete 
this onerous process to get their travel funding, others looked for alternative ways to make 
technician travel feasible and appealing. 
The Partners sought to improve this transport and travel situation by working through 
both their public and private networks of supporters. In 1972, the Mexican and American 
Presbyterian churches agreed that the American missionaries would withdraw their resources 
from Mexico, leaving community development projects in the village of Xocenpich unfinished. 
The Iowa-Yucatán Partners reached out to the Christian missionary organizations Promise, Inc. 
and the Missionary Aviation Fund to direct resources into areas like Xocenpich and continue 
regular medical and missionary flights from urban areas to rural outposts of the Peninsula.146 
Public members of the Partners of the Alliance amplified these efforts to sustain travel activity 
and technician mobility. Florida Congressman Dante Fascell, an active proponent of his state’s 
Partnership with Colombia, promoted a resolution requesting that President Richard Nixon allow 
a U.S. military plane to be used for moving technicians and development supplies from the 
United States to the countries of Latin America, creating a hemispheric network of civilian 
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development.147 Widely-touted within the Partners organization as the solution to constant 
transportation bottlenecks, the proposal was enthusiastically supported in editorials across the 
United States from Partners members.148 The Iowa Partners, for their part, promoted the proposal 
by lobbying New York Senator Henry P. Smith during his visit to Yucatán to support the 
donation of an Air Force plane to promote the movement of volunteer technicians and their 
equipment with greater speed and mobility.149 Though the “Plane for Peace” resolution was 
never achieved, this proposal illustrates the Partners’ desire to create a more comprehensive 
contact network within the Americas and expand their sphere of informal influence. 
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION: PRIVATIZATION AND SHIFTING VALUES 
By 1973, the Organization of American States disbanded the committees leading the 
Alliance for Progress, dissipating the last of the program’s dwindling economic and technical 
support efforts.150 Around this time, the National Associations of the Partners of the Alliance 
shifted into totally private status, becoming Partners of the Americas and shedding its previous 
association with the Alliance for Progress name. The organization was able to sustain itself 
through this period of reduced funding through a donation of an airplane by Summa Corp., an 
American manufacturing and holding company. The airplane was not used by the organization 
for technician travel or equipment transport, as might be expected from the Partners’ previous 
political endeavors. The plane was sold and the funds were pooled with a grant from Lilly 
Endowment, Inc. As the result, the Partners were able to accumulate resources and eventually 
distribute funding to project proposals, rather than acting as a networking organization for other 
private voluntary agencies.151 The Iowa-Yucatán Partnership persisted under this new privatized 
system, with more regular visits and student exchanges. However, the Iowa-Yucatán’s program’s 
interest and emphasis on agricultural development and industrialization declined over the 1970s 
and took greater interest in cultural and educational relations. 
Around 1972 and 1973, the Iowa-Yucatán Partners’ shift away from a public diplomacy 
role altered their focus and strategies in their transnational relationship. This was an important 
shift away from the guiding technocratic principles that drove their involvement in the Alliance 
for Progress. Even at the grassroots level, the Alliance had shaped the interests, strategies, and 
investments of American civilians in a remote region of Mexico. Mexico’s resistance to the 
                                                 
150 Alan Dobson and Steven Marsh, U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1945 (New York: Routledge Press, 2007), 92. 
151 Partners of the Americas, “Our Legacy,” Partners of the Americas, http://www.partners.net/our-legacy (accessed 
September 23, 2017). 
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Alliance and desire to develop economic and political autonomy also shaped the Iowa-Yucatán 
Partners’ development strategies, as the Partners needed to avoid intense criticism and build 
positive relationships within the Yucatán elite in order to maintain diplomatic relations. The 
Partners used every public and private resource at their disposal to overcome logistic and 
political obstacles and to build relationships with Yucatecan leaders and technicians who aligned 
with their development projects. As these technical goals began to shift and Iowa’s interest in a 
global political role grew more prominent, the transnational network that had been improvised to 
facilitate Yucatán’s development became less important.  
The origins and development of these development strategies reveal the nature and 
purpose of civilian diplomacy. The Partners mobilized a broad network of volunteers and private 
citizens in service of a diplomatic mission, but civilians at times viewed their actions as immune 
from diplomatic consequence and acted with strategic flexibility to overcome what they 
perceived as bureaucratic red tape. The Iowa-Yucatán Partners’ strategies for maintaining a 
network of contacts led them to a “tourist-technician” system, in which Yucatecans were often 
treated as recipients and Americans were treated as both propagators of universal expertise and 
consumers of local curiosities. The dynamics of this transnational relationship reflect what could 
be labeled as “informal empire,” the same dynamic which the Mexican government worried 
would develop through the Alliance for Progress. In this way, the Iowa-Yucatán Partners of the 
Alliance allow us to examine a less overt but still intense form of political power exerted by the 
United States in Latin American countries, despite the Alliance’s limited role in Mexico. These 
developments manifested themselves in a desire to transform Yucatán’s relationship to Iowa and 
to the United States through networks of transportation, communication, and expertise. The story 
of this transnational connection illustrates that histories of shifting political, cultural and 
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technological power in the Cold War can be found in their most granular forms in the actions of 
‘civilian-diplomats.’ 
To explore the complex motivations that drove Yucatecan civilians to support or resist 
the interventions of the Iowa-Yucatán Partners of the Alliance, it would be necessary to draw 
upon local sources from Mérida and the surrounding rural spaces. Of course, much of the 
material on tourism in the Yucatán Peninsula focuses on the international project and local 
activity that transformed Cancún into a profitable and successful tourist site in the 1970s. The 
limited space and resources of this project do not allow for discussion of the political attitudes 
and experiences of Yucatecans in the Partners of the Alliance projects, as most American sources 
offer only brief glimpses into how the simultaneous processes of development and tourism were 
experienced by local communities and actors. In many cases, these sources’ descriptions of 
Yucatecan people are shaped by the same paternalistic, consuming lens which drove the spread 
of the tourist-technician model.  
While this project cannot provide a synthetic picture of how Washington administrators, 
Mexican federal policymakers, Yucatecan elites, Mérida residents, and Iowan tourists exchanged 
power and knowledge through these decades of transnational exchange, this initial project invites 
further examination of civilian diplomats from both sides of the border. This thesis begins to 
explore the motives of those representatives of transnational exchange who traveled by land, air 
and sea with the intention to transform the political consciousness and environments of other 
nations. More research on the Partners’ Latin American participants can shed light on the 
motives and experiences of people who were cast into the role of “civic diplomat” as a result of 
where and how they lived, even if they did not consent to participate in that exchange. Further 
study on civilian voluntary organizations and tourists as drivers of development will allow 
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historians to develop a more complex picture of how civilian diplomacy makes political and 
cultural demands of people who, willingly and unwillingly, become involved in networks of 
power and exchange.  
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